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 CONSTITUTIONAL CASES 
2002:  
AN OVERVIEW 
Patrick J. Monahan* 
Nadine Blum** 
These two volumes (volumes 20 and 21) of the Supreme Court Law Review, 
which consist of the papers presented at Osgoode Hall Law School’s 6th 
Annual Constitutional Cases Conference held on April 4, 2003, examine the 
constitutional decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada released in the 
calendar year 2002.
1
 The Court handed down a total of 88 decisions in 2002,
2
 
23 (or 26 per cent) of which were constitutional cases.
3
 The vast majority of the 
constitutional cases in 2002 were Charter cases (19/23 cases) with only four 
federalism cases, one of which (Kitkatla) raised significant Aboriginal issues.  
It continues to be extremely difficult to get a case before the Supreme Court of 
Canada. There were just 13 appeals as of right in 2002, the lowest number in the 
past decade. In terms of applications for leave to appeal, this past year the Court 
granted leave in just 10 per cent of applications submitted to the Court, as 
compared with 12 per cent of applications that were successful in 2001 and 13 
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  A case is considered to be a “constitutional case” if the decision of the Court involves the in-
terpretation or application of a provision of the “Constitution of Canada,” as defined in s. 52 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 
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3
  The 23 constitutional decisions in calendar year 2002 were as follows: Ahani v. Canada 
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 SCC 2 [hereinafter “Ahani”]; Babcock v. Canada 
(Attorney General), 2002 SCC 57 [hereinafter “Babcock”]; Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General), 
2002 SCC 84 [hereinafter “Gosselin”]; Kitkatla Band v. British Columbia (Minister of Small Business, 
Tourism and Culture) 2002 SCC 31 [hereinafter “Kitkatla”]; Krieger v. Law Society of Alberta, 2002 
SCC 65 [hereinafter “Krieger”]; Lavallee, Rackel & Heintz v. Canada (Attorney General); White, 
Ottenheimer & Baker v. Canada (Attorney General).; R. v. Fink, 2002 SCC 61 [hereinafter 
“Lavallee”]; Lavoie v. Canada, 2002 SCC 23 [hereinafter “Lavoie”]; Mackin v. New Brunswick 
(Minister of Finance); Rice v. New Brunswick, 2002 SCC 13 [hereinafter “Mackin”]; Moreau-Bérubé 
v. New Brunswick (Judicial Council), 2002 SCC 11 [hereinafter “Moreau-Bérubé”]; Nova Scotia 
(Attorney General) v. Walsh, 2002 SCC 83 [hereinafter “Walsh”]; Quebec (Attorney General) v. 
Laroche, 2002 SCC 72 [hereinafter “Laroche”]; R. v. Fliss, 2002 SCC 16 [hereinafter “Fliss”]; R. v. 
Guignard, 2002 SCC 14 [hereinafter “Guignard”]; R. v. Hall, 2002 SCC 64 [hereinafter “Hall”]; R. v. 
Jarvis, 2002 SCC 73 [hereinafter “Jarvis”]; R. v. Law, 2002 SCC 10 [hereinafter “Law”]; R. v. Ling, 
2002 SCC 74 [hereinafter “Ling”]; R. v. Noël, 2002 SCC 67 [hereinafter “Noël”]; Ruby v. Canada 
(Solicitor General), 2002 SCC 75 [hereinafter “Ruby”]; R.W.D.S.U., Local 558 v. Pepsi-Cola Canada 
Beverages (West) Ltd., 2002 SCC 8 [hereinafter “Pepsi”]; Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), 
2002 SCC 68 [hereinafter “Sauvé”]; Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 
2002 SCC 1 [hereinafter “Suresh”]; Ward v. Canada (Attorney General), 2002 SCC 17 [hereinafter 
“Ward”]. 
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per cent in 2000. This decrease in successful leave applications is even more 
significant when one considers that there were about 25 per cent fewer 
applications for leave filed in 2002 (the first time in the past three years when 
leave applications declined.)
4
  
Another trend that has emerged in recent years, and which continued in 2002, 
is a reduction in the number of appeals heard by the Court. While the Court 
released 88 judgments in 2002, it heard just 72 appeals in 51 sitting days. Last 
year the Court also took an average of seven months from the date of hearing to 
the date of judgment in cases where judgment is reserved, which is a very slight 
increase from 2001. This suggests a desire on the part of the Court to take 
sufficient time for reflection and discussion amongst the members of Court on the 
important appeals that are heard. 
While it is always difficult to offer generalizations about the wide variety of 
constitutional decisions handed down in a given year, a number of significant 
themes did emerge from the Court’s constitutional docket in 2002. First, the 
Court was extremely receptive to Charter claims in 2002. Over 60 per cent of the 
Charter claims adjudicated by the Court were successful last year, which is the 
highest success rate for Charter claimants since 1985. Second, there were 
unusually sharp divisions amongst members of the Court in Charter cases last 
year, with at least one member of the Court dissenting in close to 50 per cent of 
the Court’s Charter decisions. This is a departure from the experience in 2001, 
when the Court was unanimous in about three-quarters of its constitutional 
decisions. Third, the Court’s approach to federalism and Aboriginal cases in 2002 
differed markedly from that in Charter cases. In the four federalism and 
Aboriginal cases handed down in 2002 the Court upheld all of the various 
statutory provisions that were being challenged, and in each instance the Court 
was unanimous.  
One innovation in our analysis this year is an attempt to identify those 
decisions which will have the greatest impact on the future development of 
Charter jurisprudence. We polled the 43 members of the Osgoode Hall Law 
School’s Constitutional Advisory Board, made up of leading academics, 
practitioners and government lawyers from across the country, for their view as to 
the most significant constitutional decisions of the year. The results, set out in 
Table 1 below, indicate a fairly broad consensus that the Gosselin case was the 
most significant constitutional decision of 2002. In Gosselin the Court upheld 
Quebec regulations which had provided lower benefit levels for younger 
claimants under Quebec’s welfare scheme in the 1980s. As is discussed below, 
what makes Gosselin such a significant case is precisely the fact that the claim in 
the case failed. The issue raised was whether governments are under a 
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constitutional obligation to provide a minimum level of social benefits to 
individuals in Canadian society. Had the result gone the other way, and the Court 
found that governments were under such a positive constitutional obligation, it 
could potentially have led to a very dramatic increase in the judicial scrutiny 
applied to social welfare and benefit programs. In effect, the result in Gosselin 
suggests that the Court remains cautious about extending its reach into this area, 
preferring to leave fairly wide scope for the exercise of discretion by legislatures 
and governments in their decisions about the design and funding of such 
programs.  
TABLE 1 
Most Significant Constitutional Cases of 2002 
(As selected by Osgoode Hall Law School’s  
Constitutional Advisory Board) 
Rank Case Total Votes 
1 Gosselin 17 
2 Sauvé 9 
3 Suresh 7 
4 Jarvis 6 
5 Walsh 
Lavallee 
4 
4 
 
The other Charter case from 2002 that was regarded as particularly 
significant by the Constitutional Advisory Board was Sauvé. Here the Court, by 
a narrow 5-4 margin, struck down a provision in the Canada Elections Act 
which denied the right to vote to prisoners who are sentenced to terms of two 
years or more in a correctional institution. Sauvé is significant not only because 
it involved the invalidation of an important provision in federal law, but also 
because that provision had been enacted in response to an earlier Court ruling 
which had invalidated a broader ban on prisoners’ voting rights. Thus Sauvé 
provided an opportunity to observe the Court’s attitude towards so-called 
“reply” legislation and the extent to which courts and legislatures can be said to 
be engaged in a Charter “dialogue.” While the Court generally has embraced 
the “dialogue” metaphor (and all members of the Court in Sauvé refer 
approvingly to it), the deep divisions in Sauvé indicate that there is no 
consensus on the practical implications of this approach to Charter adjudication 
when it comes to deciding actual cases. 
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I. CHARTER CASES 
The Court was more receptive to Charter claims in 2002 than in any year 
since 1985. Charter claims succeeded in 12 of the 19 cases handed down in 
2002, a success rate of 63 per cent, which far exceeds the average success rate 
over the past decade of about 35 per cent (See Table 2 below).
5
  
TABLE 2 
Success Rate of Charter Claimants 
Supreme Court of Canada 1991-2002 
Year Charter Challenges Claimant Succeeds Success Rate 
1991 35 15 43% 
1992 38 12 32% 
1993 42 9 21% 
Year Charter Challenges Claimant Succeeds Success Rate 
1994 26 11 42% 
1995 33 8 24% 
1996 35 8 23% 
1997 20 10 50% 
1998 21 8 38% 
1999 14 5 36% 
2000 11 3 27% 
2001 16 7 44% 
2002 19 12 63% 
TOTAL 310 108 35% 
 
Six of the successful Charter claims in 2002 involved the invalidation of 
federal or provincial legislation. Four of the statutes were federal (in Sauvé, 
Lavallee, Hall and Ruby) while two were provincial (in Mackin and Guignard). 
Five successful Charter cases involved challenges to government action (Jarvis, 
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tion Act, 1982. 
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Ling, Law, Suresh, and Noël) while the final successful Charter claim involved 
a challenge to a common law rule (Pepsi).  
1. Challenges to Legislation 
(a) The “Dialogue” Between Courts and Legislatures 
The fact that there is an ongoing internal debate amongst members of the 
Court regarding the appropriate level of deference to be afforded to Parliament 
was highlighted in the Sauvé decision. In this case, a 5-4 majority rejected 
Parliament’s “reply” legislation that denied the right to vote in federal elections 
to every person incarcerated in a correctional facility for two or more years. 
The original legislation, struck down in a 1993 Court decision, had imposed a 
broader restriction on prisoners’ voting rights, denying the right to vote to all 
those incarcerated.  
The impugned provision, section 51(e) of the Canada Elections Act, was 
challenged on the basis of the right to vote contained in section 3 of the 
Charter. Chief Justice McLachlin, writing on behalf of a majority consisting of 
Arbour, Binnie, Iacobucci, and LeBel JJ., refused to adopt a deferential 
approach in response to Charter “dialogue” and held that the right to vote is a 
fundamental value of Canadian democracy that cannot be compromised absent 
a reasonably convincing rationale. The Chief Justice rejected the argument that 
the Court should defer to Parliament since the impugned provision had been 
enacted in response to an earlier decision of the Court:  
[T]he fact that the challenged denial of the right to vote followed judicial rejection 
of an even more comprehensive denial, does not mean that the Court should defer 
to Parliament as part of a “dialogue”. Parliament must ensure that whatever law it 
passes, at whatever stage of the process, conforms to the Constitution.
6
 
However, as Richard Haigh points out in his commentary on this case, the 
majority decision in Sauvé leaves unanswered the question whether any 
restriction on prisoners’ voting rights will be able to meet the section 1 
justification threshold. In Haigh’s words, “If dialogue is to mean anything, the 
Court should, to the extent possible, expressly indicate whether Parliament is 
able to restrict prisoners’ voting rights or not.”7 He also expresses concern that 
“The lack of direction will almost certainly lead to another round of litigation if 
the federal government tries to tamper with prisoner voting rights again.”8 On 
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7
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8
  Id., at 353. 
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the other hand, as of August 2003, no such reply legislation has been 
introduced, which may suggest that the government is prepared to accept the 
outcome produced by this second round of litigation on prisoners’ voting rights. 
David Brown argues in his commentary on Sauvé that the Court has 
entrenched a less-deferential approach to section 1 when it comes to the issue 
of voting rights and thus may have, in effect, elevated the section 3 right to vote 
to a status above other Charter rights such as section 15(1) or section 7. Brown 
claims that the majority decision is difficult to reconcile with the oft-repeated 
view that there is no “hierarchy of rights” under the Charter. In Brown’s view, 
the majority in Sauvé seems to suggest that greater scrutiny will be applied to 
government attempts to justify restrictions on section 3 rights, as compared 
with rights protected by other Charter provisions.9 At the same time, it should 
be recalled that the Court has on numerous occasions applied what appear to be 
somewhat differing levels of scrutiny to impugned legislation under section 1.10 
Indeed, the 1998 judgment of Bastarache J. in Thomson Newspapers attempts 
to rationalize these differing results and to argue that they reflect a broader set 
of factors and considerations that are regarded as relevant to the section 1 
analysis.11 
The majority judgment of McLachlin C.J. in Sauvé stands in stark contrast to 
that of the minority, written by Gonthier J. and concurred in by Bastarache, 
L’Heureux-Dubé, and Major JJ. Justice Gonthier argues that the “dialogue 
model” necessitates a more deferential approach to Parliament in light of 
competing values and sociopolitical considerations with which government 
must contend. Justice Gonthier argues that the governing values are to be 
determined through a “dialogue” between government and the courts in which 
Parliament has the last word: 
In my view, especially in the context of the case at bar, the heart of the dialogue 
metaphor is that neither the courts nor Parliament hold a monopoly on the 
determination of values. Importantly, the dialogue metaphor does not signal a 
lowering of the section 1 justification standard. It simply suggests that when, after a 
full and rigorous section 1 analysis, Parliament has satisfied the court that it has 
established a reasonable limit to a right that is demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society, the dialogue ends; the court lets Parliament have the last word 
and does not substitute Parliament’s reasonable choices with its own.12  
                                                                                                                                                              
9
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  See the discussion of these varying results and approaches to s. 1 in Monahan, Constitu-
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Justice Gonthier argues that permitting the exercise of the franchise by 
offenders incarcerated for serious offences undermines the rule of law and civic 
responsibility, since these offenders have “attacked the stability and order 
within our community.”13 Therefore, the minority holds that temporary 
disenfranchisement of criminals may serve a valid educative purpose in “civic 
responsibility and respect for the rule of law.”14 Given that Parliament has made 
a reasonable choice, Gonthier J. would hold that the Court ought to defer to that 
decision. 
The so-called “dialogue” model, originally proposed by Dean Hogg and 
Alison Bushell in a path-breaking 1997 article in the Osgoode Hall Law 
Journal15 and subsequently embraced by the Supreme Court in its 1998 
decision in Vriend,16 has now been widely accepted as a useful basis for 
understanding the Court’s Charter jurisprudence. According to this theory, the 
Court is engaged in a “dialogue” with legislatures and governments in 
developing the meaning of the Charter, and the enactment of “reply” legislation 
following an adverse court ruling is cited by Hogg and Bushell as evidence of 
the existence of this dialogue. Both the majority and the minority in Sauvé refer 
approvingly to the “dialogue” theory. This suggests that, while the Court may 
well have embraced the dialogue metaphor in principle, significant divisions 
remain as to how it is to be applied and its implications in concrete cases that 
come before the Court.  
The issue of the constitutionality of “reply” legislation was also examined in 
R. v. Hall, and here the majority of the Court was ultimately more deferential in 
its approach. The provision at issue was section 515(10)(c) of the Criminal 
Code,17 which permitted the denial of bail for the purpose of maintaining 
“public confidence in the administration of justice” as well as for “any other 
just cause being shown”. This provision had been enacted by Parliament 
following R. v. Morales,18 in which an earlier provision (which had permitted 
the denial of bail “in the public interest”) had been struck down by the Court on 
grounds that it was unconstitutionally vague. 
In Hall the Court unanimously found the opening phrase of the “reply” 
legislation, which allowed the withholding of bail “on any other just cause 
being shown,” to be invalid on the basis that it conferred an open-ended judicial 
discretion to deny bail. This was inconsistent with the Charter section 11 
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  Id., at para. 114. 
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  Id., at para. 116. 
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guarantee that an individual will not be denied bail except on the basis of “just 
cause,” since it is a fundamental principle of justice that an individual cannot be 
denied bail on the basis of a vague legal provision.19 However, the Court split 
5-4 on the constitutionality of the remainder of the provision, allowing the 
denial of bail “where the detention is necessary in order to maintain confidence 
in the administration of justice, having regard to all the circumstances, 
including the apparent strength of the prosecution’s case, the gravity of the 
nature of the offence, the circumstances surrounding its commission and the 
potential for a lengthy term of imprisonment.” The majority judgment, written 
by McLachlin C.J., and concurred in by L’Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier, Bastarache 
and Binnie JJ., upheld the remainder of the provision on grounds that the denial 
of bail for the purposes of maintaining public confidence is a valid objective. 
Moreover, the majority found that the provision was not unconstitutionally 
vague since it specifically identified four factors to be taken into account by a 
judge in exercising this discretion.  
The dissent, written by Iacobucci J. for Major, Arbour, and LeBel JJ., would 
have struck down the entire subsection. In Iacobucci J.’s view, the two other 
grounds for denying bail included in the Criminal Code (namely, public safety 
and for ensuring attendance in court) were sufficient, making this additional 
ground unnecessary for the proper functioning of the bail system, as per the test 
enunciated in Morales.  
The overall result in Hall is consistent with the “vagueness” decisions that 
have followed Morales, in which the Court has demonstrated a reluctance to 
strike down provisions on grounds that they were unconstitutionally vague. 
This is particularly so when statutes contemplate the exercise of discretion by 
the courts. Even in cases where statutes utilize broad and open-ended language, 
the Court has indicated a willingness to uphold such legislation, provided it sets 
out some sort of framework for the orderly exercise of judicial discretion.20 
(b) The Balance Between Security and Liberty Post 9/11 
Another important theme in the 2002 year was the appropriate balance 
between the need to maintain collective security in the wake of the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001, and the potential threat posed by such law 
enforcement measures to civil liberties. In January 2002, in the companion 
cases of Suresh and Ahani,21 the Court surprised some commentators by 
upholding provisions in the Immigration Act which permitted the Minister to 
order the deportation of persons who posed a “danger to the security of Canada” 
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even where those persons faced the risk to torture following their deportation.22 
The Court also found that the term “terrorism,” which was used but not defined 
in the Act, had a sufficiently settled meaning as to permit legal adjudication. At 
the same time, the Court upheld the statutory provision only on the basis that 
cases in which deportation to face torture would be justified would be 
“exceptional.”23 As such, the Court indicated a willingness to subject legislation 
impinging on civil liberties in the name of national security to a narrow 
interpretation, even in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11.  
In Lavallee, released in September 2002, the Court confirmed it willingness 
to subject law enforcement procedures to significant scrutiny, even at the risk 
of potentially limited government’s ability to detect and prosecute serious 
criminal activity. The case arose when law firms had made claims of solicitor-
client privilege after materials had been seized from lawyers’ offices pursuant 
to section 488.1 of the Criminal Code. The reasoning in the case is significant 
since section 488.1, which set out the procedure for determining a claim of 
solicitor-client privilege in relation to documents seized from a law office under 
a warrant, parallels similar provisions found in the Income Tax Act as well as in 
the more recently enacted Money Laundering legislation. Section 488.1 
required that where an officer examined, copied, or seized any document from 
a lawyer’s office for which the lawyer had claimed solicitor-client privilege, the 
officer would seal the documents and place them in custody with local 
authorities. Within strict time periods, the solicitor, client, or Attorney General 
could apply to the court for a determination of whether the material was in fact 
privileged. 
Justice Arbour, for the majority (McLachlin C.J., Iacobucci, Major, 
Bastarache and Binnie JJ. concurring), held that solicitor-client privilege is 
protected under section 8 of the Charter as part of a client’s fundamental right 
to privacy. Section 488.1 could not be upheld as it more than minimally 
impaired solicitor-client privilege. Due to the strict time lines to apply for a 
determination that the material was privileged, it was possible that documents 
which would otherwise rightly be deemed as privileged would be disclosed to 
the state should the client’s lawyer fail to meet the deadline. The provision 
violated section 8, could not be upheld under section 1, and was invalid. 
Another flaw in the legislation was the possibility, as per section 488.1(4)(b), 
that a judge could allow the Attorney General to examine the documents to 
assist him or her in deciding whether or not the documents were privileged. 
These flaws in the legislation, along with others, led the majority to conclude 
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  Although on the facts in Suresh the Court overturned the Minister’s deportation order, in 
both Suresh and Ahani the constitutional validity of the underlying statutory provisions was upheld. 
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 Suresh, supra, note 3, at para. 78.  
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that the client’s section 8 rights were not adequately protected by section 488.1 
and thus the legislation was unreasonable. As commentators Mahmud Jamal 
and Brian Morgan note, this case is significant because it is the first time 
solicitor-client privilege has been used to strike down legislation. Further, 
solicitor-client privilege is now protected under both sections 7 and 8 of the 
Charter, though Arbour J. relied solely on section 8 to strike down the 
provision.24  
The Court’s ringing endorsement of solicitor-client privilege in Lavallee 
may have contributed to the federal government’s subsequent announcement on 
March 20, 2003, to withdraw money-laundering regulations under the Proceeds 
of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act25 which would have 
required lawyers to report any large cash transactions, terrorist property and 
suspicious transactions by their clients to a new federal agency.26 The Canadian 
Federation of Law Societies had launched a constitutional challenge to the 
regulations. Despite this reversal, the government has stated that it still intends 
to bring lawyers into the anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist regulatory 
scheme. However, as of August 2003, the necessary regulations had not been 
announced.27 
(c) Gosselin and Positive Rights Under the Charter  
In 2002, the case with the most significance for the development of Charter 
jurisprudence was Gosselin, in which the Court upheld an age-based distinction 
in Quebec’s provincial welfare regulations by a narrow 5-4 margin. The 
Charter issue arose when Louise Gosselin challenged section 29(a) of Quebec’s 
Regulation Respecting Social Aid [Regulation] made under the 1984 Social Aid 
Act, which provided for a two-tiered system of welfare benefits: persons under 
age 30 were entitled to approximately one third of the benefits provided to 
those over 30. The Regulation also provided that persons under 30 could make 
up the two-thirds reduction through participation in education and work-
experience programs. In 1989, this scheme had been repealed and replaced by 
regulations not based on age. Louise Gosselin brought a claim on behalf of 
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  S.C. 2001, c. 17. 
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some 75,000 welfare claimants under age 30 who had received reduced welfare 
benefits during the 1987 to 1989 period, seeking a declaration that the age 
distinction in the Regulation was invalid and that, therefore, the members of the 
class should be reimbursed for the benefit reduction arising from the fact that 
they were at that time under age 30.  
Ms. Gosselin’s Charter claim was based both on section 15 (on the theory 
that the distinction between those over 30 versus those under 30 was 
inconsistent with section 15’s guarantee against age discrimination) as well as 
on the basis of section 7 (on the theory that the guarantee of life, liberty and 
security of the person provides a positive obligation on the state to provide a 
minimum level of social benefits to needy individuals.) Both claims were 
rejected, the section 7 claim by a substantial 7-2 margin and the section 15 
claim by a narrow 5-4 margin.  
The Gosselin case is mainly significant for the Court’s analysis of the claim 
that section 7 of the Charter places positive obligations on the state to protect 
life, liberty and security of the person. Writing for the majority, McLachlin C.J. 
(for Gonthier, Iacobucci, Major, Bastarache, Binnie and LeBel JJ.), held that 
section 29(a) of the Regulation did not infringe section 7 of the Charter. The 
claim that the appellant’s section 7 Charter rights were infringed was based on 
three claims: first, that economic rights are protected by the right to life, liberty 
and security of the person; second, that a failure to provide adequate benefits 
constitutes a “deprivation” by the state; and third, that the “deprivation” at issue 
was not in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. Chief Justice 
McLachlin reviewed the jurisprudence on section 7 and found that the purpose 
of section 7 is to protect life, liberty, and security of the person from 
deprivations that occur as a result of an individual’s interaction with the 
administration of justice. In this case, the administration of justice was not 
plainly implicated. While not ruling out the possibility that the interpretation of 
section 7 could evolve incrementally to encompass deprivations occurring 
outside of the context of the administration of justice, McLachlin C.J. found 
that a larger hurdle to the section 7 argument was the fact that jurisprudence 
does not suggest that section 7 places positive obligations on the state. Rather, 
section 7 has been interpreted as restricting the state’s ability to deprive people 
of life, liberty and security of the person. Such a deprivation, she found, did not 
exist in the case at bar. Again, while refusing to rule out the possibility that 
positive obligations on the state to sustain life, liberty or security of the person 
could potentially be made out in special circumstances in a future case, 
McLachlin C.J. held that this novel argument could not be accepted on the facts 
before the Court.  
The contrary argument — that there is a substantive and affirmative right to 
the provision of economic support by government — was set forth in Arbour 
J.’s dissent (joined by L’Heureux-Dubé J.) which concluded “that the section 7 
14  Supreme Court Law Review (2003), 20 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
rights to ‘life, liberty and security of the person’ include a positive 
dimension.”28 Justice Arbour’s dissent argues for a broad interpretation of 
section 7: 
Whereas the course of section 7 jurisprudence may have once supported a legalistic 
reliance on the subheading “Legal Rights” as a way of delimiting the scope of 
section 7 protection, the more recent turn in section 7 jurisprudence indicates that 
this interpretive device has been supplanted by a purposive and contextual 
approach to the recognition of constitutionally protected rights.29 
Justice Arbour then sets forth a novel “two rights theory” of section 7. In so 
doing, she rejects the “general impression” that the first clause in section 7, the 
right to life, liberty and security of the person, is guaranteed, but only against 
deprivations which violate principles of fundamental justice, as set out in the 
second clause.30 Rather, Arbour J. argues, the fact that “the section’s first clause 
affords some additional protection seems, as a purely textual matter, beyond 
reasonable objection.”31 In her view, therefore, it should not be necessary to 
demonstrate that there has been a positive “deprivation” by the state of a 
protected interest (nor that such deprivation be contrary to the principles of 
fundamental justice) in order to found a section 7 claim.  
This interpretation of section 7 is a departure from the previously settled 
interpretation of the provision which suggested that it conferred one right, 
namely, the right not to be deprived of life, liberty or security of the person 
except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. This settled 
approach to section 7 has been assumed by the Supreme Court in all cases 
involving the provision over the past decade, since the Court has consistently 
required not only that there be a deprivation of a protected section 7 right but 
also that such deprivation be contrary to the principles of fundamental justice 
before there can be a breach of section 7.32 In Gosselin Arbour J. argued, in 
contrast, that this established interpretation of section 7 as a one-right guarantee 
                                                                                                                                                              
28
  Gosselin, supra, note 3, at para. 308. 
29
  Id., at para. 316. 
30
  Id., at para. 339. 
31
  Id., at para. 340. 
32
  For example, in Winnipeg Child and Family Services v. K.L.W., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 519, the 
majority of the Court found that the warrantless apprehension of a child deemed to be in need of 
protection was a breach of the parents’ security of the person, but that this deprivation was con-
sistent with the principles of fundamental justice; therefore, there was no breach of s. 7. Although 
Arbour J. dissented in Winnipeg Child and Family, her dissent seemed to assume that in order to 
find a breach of s. 7 it was necessary to find not only a deprivation of security of the person but also 
that this deprivation was contrary to the principles of fundamental justice; where Arbour J. differed 
from the majority was in her conclusion that the warrantless apprehension was in fact contrary to 
the principles of fundamental justice and therefore contrary to s. 7. 
(2003), 20 S.C.L.R. (2d) Constitutional Cases 2002 15 
 
 
had been developed based on an “impression” that this was the correct 
interpretation. In her view, the Court had never explicitly ruled on the correct 
approach to section 7.33 Further, Arbour J. cited a number of cases to support 
her positive rights theory, including Dunmore,34 where the Court imposed a 
positive obligation on the province of Ontario to guarantee the right of 
association to agricultural workers.  
As pointed out by Jamie Cameron elsewhere in this volume,35 Arbour J.’s 
analysis returned to the plain text of section 7 as a means of overcoming the 
“doctrinal constraints” on section 7’s interpretation. Yet these doctrinal 
constraints were themselves grounded in a deeper and important respect for the 
institutional boundaries between courts and legislatures. If all that is necessary 
to establish a breach of section 7 is a deprivation of “liberty” or “security of the 
person,” the scope of the provision is exceptionally broad and would subject a 
huge variety of government legislation and regulation to judicial scrutiny under 
section 1. The established approach to section 7, one endorsed by the majority 
in Gosselin, seeks to give a substantive interpretation to the provision while at 
the same time respecting institutional boundaries by confining its content to the 
administration of justice. In Professor Cameron’s view, one troubling aspect of 
Arbour J.’s analysis is that she “disregards the question of boundaries on 
review.” In fact, Cameron argues that throughout the entire Gosselin decision, 
where issues of institutional competence should have been at the forefront, such 
issues were largely ignored which, in her view, “can only place the legitimacy 
of [judicial] review at risk.”36 
Although the section 7 claim in Gosselin failed by a substantial 7-2 margin, 
6 of the 7 members of the majority refused to rule out the possibility that 
section 7 could impose positive obligations on the state in a future case. This 
leaves it open to litigants in future cases to advance similar positive rights 
claims, which will inevitably work their way back up to the country’s highest 
Court for consideration. It remains to be seen whether a future Court will, if at 
all, deal with the important institutional considerations at stake in the 
imposition of positive social benefit obligations on the state. 
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With respect to section 15(1), the claim failed because, according to the 
majority, there was no “discrimination,” which is a necessary element to a 
section 15 claim. The section 15 debate between McLachlin C.J. and 
Bastarache J. (who wrote the lead dissenting decision on this issue) revolved 
around the question of whether the Regulation resulted in a violation of the 
“human dignity” of welfare recipients under 30 years of age.  
Chief Justice McLachlin’s analysis focused on the four contextual factors for 
establishing discrimination and violation of human dignity that were originally 
identified in the 1999 Law decision.37 The Chief Justice found that none of 
these contextual factors led to the conclusion that the age distinction in the 
Regulation violated the claimant’s human dignity. 
First, McLachlin C.J. rejected the claim that members of the complainant 
group suffered from pre-existing disadvantage, arguing that “[i]f anything, 
people under 30 appear to be advantaged over older people in finding 
employment.”38 Second, she held that the evidence indicated a correspondence 
between the scheme and the actual circumstances of welfare recipients under 30 
in cases where younger welfare recipients specifically lacked certain skills 
required to get permanent jobs. In providing that younger recipients who 
participated in education and skills program would receive increased benefits, 
the government was implicitly recognizing the potential of youth by 
encouraging them to participate in such programs. The third factor, regarding 
the “ameliorative purpose,” was found to be neutral, since the scheme was not 
designed to improve the conditions of another group. Finally, McLachlin C.J. 
held that the findings of the trial judge and the evidence did not support the 
view that the overall impact on the affected individuals undermined their 
human dignity. In fact she concludes the opposite: “In my view, the interest 
promoted by the differential treatment at issue in this case is intimately and 
inextricably linked to the essential human dignity that animates the equality 
guarantee set out at section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter.”39  
Justice Bastarache, in contrast, felt that age is an immutable personal 
characteristic falling squarely within the section 15 principle that people should 
not be penalized for something they cannot change. While McLachlin C.J. 
rejected the claimant’s assertion that she should be compared to welfare 
recipients over 30 (with the Chief Justice holding that the appropriate 
comparators were people under age 30 versus those over 30), Bastarache J. 
argued that contextual analysis required a consideration of the specific position 
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of young welfare recipients. He asks rhetorically, “If the vulnerability of the 
appellant’s group as welfare recipients cannot be recognized at this stage, can 
we really be said to be undertaking a contextual analysis?”40  
The discussion of section 15(1) in Gosselin is just one more page in the 
continuing saga of tortuous equality analysis at the Supreme Court. While all 
members of the Court continue to embrace the framework for section 15 set 
forth in Law, there are significant divisions as to how that analysis should be 
applied in particular cases. Moreover, as various commentators have observed, 
the contextual factors identified in Law are highly abstract and open-ended, 
meaning that it is extremely difficult to predict how they will be applied in 
future cases. Further, the line between section 15(1) and section 1 justification 
analysis continues to become ever-more obscured, with many of the contextual 
factors in Law seemingly identical to the kinds of considerations that would 
normally be regarded as relevant under section 1. This tendency to incorporate 
justification analysis into section 15(1) is worrying because it may make it 
increasingly difficult as well as unpredictable for claimants to establish a prima 
facie breach of their Charter equality rights.  
This obstacle standing in the way of establishing even a prima facie breach 
of section 15 is reflected in the fact that there was only one partially successful 
section 15 claim at the Supreme Court in 2002: in Lavoie a hiring preference 
for citizens in the federal public service was held to violate section 15 by seven 
out of nine judges, but was upheld under section 1 by six of the nine. Contrast 
this with the result in Walsh, where the Court found that the exclusion of 
opposite-sex cohabiting couples from the Matrimonial Property Act41 was not 
discrimination as it does not affect the dignity or deny access to benefits or 
advantages available to married persons. What these cases indicate is that the 
task of establishing a breach of section 15 continues to be a significant hurdle 
for claimants to overcome, which seems a somewhat ironic legacy of the 
Andrews case,42 the first section 15 case decided by the Supreme Court of 
Canada and one which had called for a robust interpretation of section 15. 
(d) Other Challenges to Legislation in 2002 
Two challenges to provincial legislation were successful in 2002. In Mackin, 
provincial legislation abolishing supernumerary judges was struck down on 
grounds that it infringed guarantees of judicial independence; however the 
claimants’ damages claim was dismissed. In Guignard, a municipal bylaw 
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prohibiting advertising signs was found to be unconstitutional as an unjustified 
infringement of freedom of expression under section 2(b) of the Charter, with 
the declaration of invalidity suspended for six months. 
Other challenges to legislation in 2002 included Moreau-Bérubé,43 Suresh 
(which, as noted above, involved a challenge to legislation as well as to 
government action), and Ruby. In Moreau-Bérubé the Court, led by Arbour J., 
unanimously rejected the Charter claim that the procedure for sanctioning the 
misconduct of a provincial court judge, as provided for under the New 
Brunswick Provincial Court Act, violated the principle of judicial 
independence. The Court emphasized the fact that the alleged misconduct was 
reviewed by a council composed primarily of judges, who would be sensitive to 
the delicate balance between judicial independence and judicial integrity. In 
Suresh, the Court unanimously rejected the claim that statutory provisions in 
the Immigration Act allowing the deportation of a refugee facing risk of torture 
were contrary to section 7 of the Charter. However, the Court also ruled that in 
exercising the discretion conferred by section 53(1)(b) of the Immigration Act, 
the Minister must conform to the principles of fundamental justice under 
section 7. The Minister’s decision to order the deportation of Suresh was held 
to be inconsistent with section 7, on the basis that the Minister had failed to 
adequately consider the risk of torture in making the deportation decision.  
The claimant in Ruby, on the other hand, was successful in part in 
challenging provisions of the Privacy Act on the basis of sections 7 and 2(b) of 
the Charter. The provisions in question, section 52(2)(a) and (3), required in 
camera hearings and ex parte representations when the government denied an 
applicant’s request for access to personal information on the grounds of 
national security or maintenance of foreign confidences. The claimant’s section 
7 claim was unanimously rejected; Arbour J. ruled that ex parte submissions by 
government were not contrary to section 7 as fairness is ensured through 
procedural safeguards and rights of appeal. However, section 2(b) (freedom of 
expression including the freedom to hear and read information relating to 
government and the court system) was found to be violated by the mandatory in 
camera hearings and this violation failed the proportionality test under section 
1; the provision required the whole hearing (not just the parts of the evidence 
covered by the exemptions) to be held in camera. The Court read down section 
51(2)(a) to apply only to ex parte submissions mandated by section 51(3). 
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2. Challenges to Government Action 
A number of cases involving challenges to government action (as distinct 
from challenges to legislation), and arising in the criminal context, brought to 
light significant issues with respect to privacy, the right to protection from the 
state from unreasonable search and seizure, and the manner in which personal 
information is transmitted from one arm of government to another. In Ling and 
Jarvis, heard concurrently by the Court, at issue was whether the use of 
evidence obtained during an audit pursuant to sections 231.1(1) and 231.2(1) of 
the Income Tax Act to further investigate offences under section 239(1)44 
violates the taxpayer’s Charter rights. The Court, in a unanimous decision 
written by Iacobucci and Major JJ., held that once the “predominant purpose” 
of the investigation shifted from a routine audit to the determination of a 
taxpayer’s penal liability under section 239, a warrant was required in order for 
the search to be in compliance with Charter rights. This ruling resulted in the 
exclusion of some evidence in Jarvis and the ordering of a new trial to 
determine the admissibility of some evidence in Ling. Similarly in Law, 
photocopied documents, obtained from a safe recovered by the police and 
forwarded to tax authorities, were excluded as evidence. Justice Bastarache, 
once again for a unanimous Court, held that the fact that the safe was stolen 
property did not support the inference that the owner had relinquished his or her 
section 8 expectation of privacy in such property; evidence obtained from the 
recovered safe was thus excluded under section 24(2).  
These decisions have been praised by some for the Court’s protection of an 
accused’s right to privacy. One commentator said in response to the Jarvis 
decision, “The Court has affirmed the robust constitutional protection of 
privacy over information under section 8 of the Charter and imposed limits on 
regulators in the context of investigating regulatory offences.”45 However, 
Robert Frater of the Department of Justice Canada has expressed concern that 
the requirement that auditors obtain a warrant once the “predominant purpose” 
shifts to penal investigation may have the effect of encouraging prosecution. 
This is because investigators will be encouraged to constantly reassess the 
nature of their investigation and to obtain a warrant earlier in investigations in 
order to avoid the possibility of a court ruling to exclude evidence, should it 
find the investigation to be “penal.”46 If Frater’s prediction proves accurate, it 
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could once again demonstrate the fact that judicial decisions often produce 
unintended and unforeseen consequences. 
Other challenges to government action included Fliss and Nöel. In Fliss, an 
accused had freely confessed to an undercover police officer that he had killed 
a woman and the conversation was surreptitiously recorded by the officer. 
While the taping had been judicially authorized, the trial judge found that the 
authorization ought to have been refused for insufficiency of evidence and the 
taped confession was therefore inadmissible. However the undercover police 
officer was allowed to testify at trial, and to review the transcript of the 
confession in order to refresh his memory. The Supreme Court of Canada found 
that using the transcript in this manner violated section 8, since the result was 
that the officer was able to testify to matters which he otherwise would have 
forgotten. Despite the violation of section 8, the Supreme Court found that this 
did not affect the fairness of the trial. Therefore it was appropriate to admit the 
testimony under section 24(2) of the Charter, since this result would not bring 
the administration of justice into disrepute.  
In Nöel, the appellant, who was charged with murder, had testified at his trial. 
In its cross-examination of the accused, the Crown had relied on inconsistent 
testimony he had offered at the earlier trial of his brother, who had been charged 
with the same murder and been acquitted. The Court held that, while it was 
appropriate for the Crown to utilize the earlier testimony of the accused on 
cross-examination for the purpose of testing his credibility, the Crown had gone 
further and attempted to have the accused actually adopt incriminating portions 
of his earlier testimony. This was held by the Court to be contrary to protection 
against self incrimination in section 13 of the Charter, as well as inconsistent 
with section 5 of the Canada Evidence Act,47 and a new trial was ordered. 
II. FEDERALISM/ABORIGINAL CASES IN 2002 
The federalism docket in 2002 continues to reflect the shift away from 
division of powers adjudication towards Charter issues. In the four federalism 
cases decided by the Supreme Court of Canada in 2002, the Court was 
unanimous on each occasion: Babcock (ruling that section 39 of the Canada 
Evidence Act, which exempts Cabinet confidences from disclosure does not 
invade the core jurisdiction of superior courts), Kitkatla (upholding provisions 
of the British Columbia Heritage Conservation Act, allowing the regulation of 
Aboriginal artifacts, as valid provincial legislation), Kreiger (upholding rule 
28(d) of the Alberta Code of Professional Conduct, requiring prosecutors to 
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make timely disclosure of evidence, on the basis that such regulation does not 
invade the scheme of federal criminal law and procedure), and Ward (upholding 
federal regulations which prohibit the sale or barter of young harp seals or 
hooded seals on the basis of the federal fisheries power in section 91(13), but 
not on the basis of the criminal law power in section 91(27).)  
The only real surprise in these cases arose in Ward, where the Court, in a 
decision written by McLachlin C.J., indicated that section 27 of the federal 
Marine Mammal Regulations48 could be upheld under the fisheries power in 
section 91(13) of the Constitution Act, 1867, but not under the section 91(27) 
criminal law power. Ward was charged with selling hooded seal pelts contrary 
to section 27. He challenged the prohibition on the ground that it was an 
attempt by Parliament to regulate local trade. In rejecting the challenge, the 
Court held that Parliament’s objective was to eliminate commercial hunting of 
these seals by prohibiting their sale, which would decrease the incentive to hunt 
them. While the provisions regulated the sale or barter of pelts, the pith and 
substance of the legislation was not related to property or civil rights but rather 
to the regulation of fisheries. However, the Court went on to conclude, in 
obiter, that while section 27 had both a prohibition and a penalty, no valid 
criminal law purpose had been established as “Public peace, order, security and 
morality played no direct role in its adoption.”49  
This holding is significant since, in a series of cases decided over the past 
decade, the Court had given an extremely broad interpretation to the criminal 
law power.50 Ward represents the first case in recent years in which the Court 
has expressly rejected a federal attempt to justify legislation on the basis of the 
criminal law power. At the same time, the Court’s apparent willingness to 
impose some limits on the criminal law power had been signaled in the 
Firearms Reference51 where the Court, despite upholding the impugned 
legislation in that case, noted that the criminal law power “is not unlimited” and 
cited with seeming approval concerns identified in the minority dissenting 
judgment in the 1997 Hydro-Quebec decision.52  
While none of the decisions rendered in 2002 dealt directly with Aboriginal 
or treaty rights, the Kitkatla decision clarifies certain important aspects of the 
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application of provincial laws to Aboriginal peoples. The case concerned a 
constitutional challenge brought by the Kitkatla band to the application of 
British Columbia legislation, the Heritage Conservation Act (HCA), to 
culturally modified trees. According to the Ministry of Small Business, 
Tourism and Culture, “CMTs are trees which bear the marks of past Aboriginal 
intervention occurring as part of traditional Aboriginal use.”53 The claimants 
argued that sections 12(2)(a), (c) and (d) of the HCA were ultra vires the 
province as they referred explicitly to Aboriginal peoples, providing 
specifically for the protection as well as destruction of Aboriginal artifacts. In 
the alternative, they argued that the provisions touched upon the core of 
Indianness and could not apply of their own force and, moreover, could not be 
saved by section 88 of the Indian Act because they were not laws of general 
application.54 
Justice LeBel held that the provisions of the HCA were properly within the 
jurisdiction of “Property and Civil Rights” of the province, and were laws of 
“general application” pursuant to section 88 of the Indian Act. In defending the 
position that the laws are not inconsistent with the Indian Act, LeBel J. argues 
that the impugned provisions neither single out Aboriginal peoples nor impair 
their status or condition as Indians as they applied equally to all citizens of 
British Columbia and all heritage objects and sites, and struck an appropriate 
balance between native and non-native interests. Second, LeBel J. decided that 
the provisions of the HCA did not “affect the essential and distinctive core values 
of Indianness which would engage the federal power over native affairs and First 
Nations in Canada,”55 though they might have graver consequences for 
Aboriginals. 
Kitkatla clarifies the fact that, even where a provincial law makes express 
reference to Aboriginal peoples or matters, it may still qualify as a “law of 
general application” and apply to Aboriginal peoples through the operation of 
section 88 of the Indian Act. The Court was undoubtedly influenced by the fact 
that the predominant purpose of the legislation was to preserve and protect 
Aboriginal cultural artifacts. 
Commenting on the Kitkatla decision, Jean Leclair argues that “Indianness 
appears to have been confined to established Aboriginal and treaty rights.” 
Therefore, according to Leclair, the Court was able to uphold the Act by 
holding that “Aboriginal rights not meeting the established Aboriginal and 
treaty rights test, as laid out in R. v. Sparrow had a double aspect” and, 
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therefore, the validity of the Act could be addressed “through the more familiar 
test of the aspect doctrine.”56 In his assessment, Kent McNeil suggest that 
Kitkatla should be cause for concern for Aboriginal peoples because it seems to 
indicate that the Supreme Court of Canada generally “favours the application of 
provincial laws … unless good reasons supported by evidence can be provided 
to show why those laws should not apply in particular circumstances.”57 
One federalism case in 2002 that raised significant issues outside of the 
Aboriginal context was Krieger. The Krieger case arose when an Albertan 
Crown Attorney, K, failed to make timely disclosure of evidence to defence 
counsel. The accused complained to the Law Society of Alberta. K sought an 
order that the Law Society had no jurisdiction to review a Crown prosecutor’s 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion, as this was a matter falling within the 
federal government’s jurisdiction over criminal law and procedure. Justices 
Iacobucci and Major, for the majority, ruled that the disclosure of relevant 
evidence is a legal duty not falling within the realm of prosecutorial discretion. 
The Law Society has the power, pursuant to the provincial Legal Profession 
Act, to investigate allegations of ethical misconduct if it is believed that the 
Crown prosecutor may have acted dishonestly or in bad faith in his or her 
failure to disclose relevant evidence. Therefore, the rule in question is intra 
vires provincial power under the provincial jurisdiction over the administration 
of justice. 
As noted by authors Lori Sterling and Heather Mackay,58 the Krieger 
decision is important because the Court explicitly recognized that the 
independence of the Attorney General in the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion has its foundation in the Constitution. Iacobucci and Major JJ. write: 
It is a constitutional principle that the Attorneys General of this country must act 
independently of partisan concerns when exercising their delegated sovereign 
authority to initiate, continue or terminate prosecutions. So long as they are made 
honestly and in good faith, prosecutorial decisions related to this authority are 
protected by the doctrine of prosecutorial discretion.59 
Thus, according to Sterling and Mackay, the Supreme Court of Canada 
demonstrated deference to decisions made by prosecutors such that “only a 
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very limited range of cases can properly be brought before a provincial law 
society, namely where the prosecutor has acted dishonestly or in bad faith.”60  
III. UNANIMITY AND DISSENT ON THE SUPREME COURT  
OF CANADA IN 2002 
In last year’s review of the Court’s constitutional decisions from the 2001 
calendar year, it was noted that the Court had been unanimous in approximately 
three quarters of its constitutional decisions, a relatively high unanimity rate yet 
one consistent with historical patterns. (See Table 3 below.) This year saw a 
reversal of that trend, with the Court handing down unanimous decisions in 14 
(or 61 per cent) of the year’s 23 constitutional decisions. The decrease in 
unanimity is the result of unusually sharp divisions in Charter cases in which 
dissenting judgments were written in nine of the 19 Charter cases; in contrast 
the four Aboriginal and federalism cases in 2002 were unanimous. 
TABLE 3 
Unanimous versus Split Decisions 
In all Constitutional Cases 1995-2002 
(Includes Federalism, Aboriginal and Charter) 
Year Unanimous Split Percentage Unanimous 
1995 17 9 65% 
1996 28 10 74% 
1997 14 8 64% 
1998 12 9 57% 
1999 11 7 61% 
2000 8 4 67% 
2001 14 5 74% 
2002 14 9 61% 
 
For some commentators, the trend towards greater division in 2002 in 
Charter cases is a cause for concern. For example, Richard Haigh61 remarks that 
the low unanimity rate of the Court, combined with what he perceives to be the 
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Court’s increased use of sarcasm and personalized rhetoric, connotes increasing 
frustration and worrisome political and ideological divisions within the Court. 
Turning to a consideration of the tendencies of individual members of the 
Court, in the three years since Beverley McLachlin was appointed Chief Justice 
the most frequent dissenters in constitutional cases have been L’Heureux- Dubé 
and Arbour JJ. (see Table 4 below). Justice Arbour’s eight dissents have all 
favoured the Charter claimant and have involved a variety of Charter claims. 
Justice L’Heureux-Dubé dissented three times in favour of the claimant (all in 
section 15 cases) and four times in favour of the government (all involving 
legal rights claims). The members of the Court who dissented the least 
frequently during this period have been Gonthier J. (three dissents, all in favour 
of the government), Iacobucci J. (four dissents, all in favour of the claimants) 
and Bastarache J. (four dissents, equally divided).  
TABLE 4 
Dissents in Constitutional Cases on the McLachlin Court 
January 1, 2000 – December 31, 2002 
Justice Dissents 
(Dissents 
Authored) 
Direction of Dissent – 
favoured 
Claim/Challenge 
Direction of Dissent  
– Opposed 
Claim/Challenge 
McLachlin C.J. 6 5 1 
L’Heureux-Dubé J. 7 3 4 
Gonthier J. 3 0 3 
Iacobucci J. 4 4 0 
Major J. 6 4 2 
Bastarache J. 4 2 2 
Binnie J. 5 4 1 
Arbour J. 8 8 0 
LeBel J. 6 4 2 
Totals 49 34 15 
IV. CONCLUSION — THE GROWING DEBATE  
OVER JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 
The debate over the judicial activism versus restraint, which has emerged as 
a significant political issue in recent years, has gained significant momentum in 
the past year. In large part this was a product of the June 2003 decision of the 
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Ontario Court of Appeal in Halpern v. Canada (Attorney General),62 ruling that 
the common law definition of marriage as the union of a man and woman to the 
exclusion of all others was unconstitutional. This decision has generated 
significant controversy, with some critics claiming that it demonstrates that the 
judiciary has inappropriately usurped the role of legislatures and governments 
in the development of public policy.  
One question that arises is whether the recent changes in the membership of 
the Court resulting from the retirements of L’Heureux-Dubé and Gonthier JJ. 
will produce a shift of the Court’s approach to the Charter. As Table 4 
indicates, these two justices were relatively more likely to support governments 
as opposed to Charter claimants in divided legal rights cases (i.e., those arising 
under sections 7-14 of the Charter). This might suggest that their departure will 
produce an even greater tendency on the part of the Supreme Court to support 
Charter claimants as opposed to legislatures and governments in these kinds of 
cases. On the other hand, L’Heureux-Dubé J. was one of the strongest 
proponents of equality rights on the Court, consistently siding with equality-
seeking groups in section 15 cases. It is unclear whether any of the other 
members of the Court will carry on with this legacy now that she has retired.  
In short, the effects produced by the recent membership changes on the 
Court defy easy prediction. Indeed, one constant with the Supreme Court is that 
the institution typically defies the predictions and expectations of even the 
closest observers. The Court has also demonstrated the capacity to shift ground 
in the face of significant public controversy, as evidenced by the two rather 
conflicting Marshall decisions handed down in the fall of 2001. One thing that 
has become clear in recent years, as reflected in the Court’s deft handling of 
politically controversial issues such as Quebec secession or the firearms debate, 
is that the Court is a savy political as well as a legal institution. As such, it can 
be expected that the Court will be sensitive to the public debate that has 
emerged over its role, and that this political debate will subtly but surely shape 
and condition its approach to the Charter in the future.  
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